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Abstract 
When confronted with stressful or emotionally arousing situations, regulatory abilities 
should allow us to adaptively cope. However, depressed individuals often have a low 
sense of perceived control and are characterized by a negative expectation bias regarding 
their ability to deal with future stressful events. Low expectancy concerning the ability to 
deal with future stressful events may result in less initiation of proactive control, a crucial 
mechanism of cognitive control reflecting sustained and anticipatory maintenance of 
goal-relevant information in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to optimize cognitive 
performance. In this theoretical review we integrate a diverse body of literature. We 
argue that the expectancy of an individual’s regulatory abilities prior to the presentation 
of an arousing event or stressful task will be related to anticipation and proactive up- or 
down regulation of specific neurocircuits before the actual encounter with the stressful 
event occurs, in a manner that can be either adaptive or maladaptive. Moreover, we 
discuss the important role of self-esteem as well as the ability to accept the situation  
when coping is not possible. Our approach has implications for a broad range of disorders 
and conditions in which stress regulation plays a role, and can be used to guide the use of 
recently developed clinical interventions, as well as to fine-tune interventions to facilitate 
proactive control. 
 
Keywords: Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex, stress regulation, anticipation, depression, 
proactive control, coping, self-esteem, neurocognitive therapy 
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The Role of Expectancy and Proactive Control in Stress Regulation:  
A Neurocognitive Framework for Regulation Expectation  
When we are confronted with situations or thoughts perceived as unpleasant, 
aversive or threatening, a series of biological and psychological processes is activated, 
generating a coordinated response. This so-called stress response is triggered when an 
individual’s well-being or health is threatened. Relational or financial problems,  
unpredictability, an acute threat, or a challenging situation such as a job interview are 
examples of  stressful situations or stressors that can initiate a stress response. Regulatory 
abilities, which we call stress regulation, generally allow us to cope with these situations 
in an adaptive way. However, there are large individual differences in how well people 
handle life stressors. Indeed, problems with stress regulation are thought to play a central 
role in the development and clinical course of depression (Hooley, Orley & Teasdale, 
1986; Hankin, 2008; Morris, Ciesla & Garber, 2010). It has also been suggested that, 
over time, depressive episodes can be triggered by progressively milder and milder 
stressors (Monroe & Harkness, 2005; but see also Anderson et al., 2016).      
Research shows the important role of stress regulation  in the development of 
different forms of psychopathology, such as depression, where psychosocial stressors are 
strongly implicated in the triggering of new episodes (Kendler et al., 2000). 
Understanding the role of stressors in depression requires consideration of the interaction 
between biological, cognitive and environmental factors (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). 
Vulnerability to the effects of stressful events can be conceptualized as a trait-like latent 
endogenous process related to genetic, as well as other biological and psychological 
variables (Gotlib, Joormann, Minor & Hallmayer, 2008; Ingram & Siegle, 2009).  
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Cognitive control, which is a crucial concept related to resilience to stressors, refers 
to processes that allow adaptive changes in information processing and behavior to 
current goals. Numerous studies have documented the role of prefrontal circuits in 
cognitive control (i.e., regulation) over stressful events (e.g., Baeken et al., 2014), as well 
as negative emotions (e.g., Leyman, De Raedt, Vanderhasselt & Baeken, 2011) and 
painful physical stimuli (e.g., Strigo, Simmons, Matthews, Craig & Paulus, 2008). 
However, our ability to deal with stressful events goes far beyond dealing with stressors 
that occur in the moment. Anticipation of future stressful events is an important 
component of emotion processing (Phillips, Drevets, Rauch & Lane, 2003). It also 
influences acute emotional experiences (Kirsch, 1985). Simply knowing that we have an 
adaptive response to the stressor available can reduce aversiveness, decrease anxiety prior 
to exposure to the stressful event and reduce anticipatory physiological arousal (Gatchel 
& Proctor, 1976).  
In this theoretical review we start from depression but take an essentially 
transdiagnostic approach and seek to integrate a diverse body of literature. Braver (2012) 
has recently developed a cognitive control framework distinguishing between proactive 
and reactive modes of control (the Dual Mechanisms of Control Framework). Proactive 
control occurs before the onset of a stimulus and involves preparatory processes that 
serve to enhance coping with conflict or challenge when it is presented. It is a crucial 
mechanism of cognitive control reflecting sustained and anticipatory maintenance of 
goal-relevant information in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) to optimize 
cognitive performance.  Reactive control, in contrast, can be thought of as a corrective 
mechanism. Reactive control involves recruiting processing resources to resolve conflict 
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when that conflict is actually occurring (Braver, 2012). Building on this perspective, we 
suggest that if depressed (or other vulnerable) individuals have negative expectations 
concerning their ability to deal with future stressful events, this may result in less 
initiation of proactive control.  That is, the expectancy of an individual’s regulatory 
abilities prior to the presentation of an arousing event or stressful task will be related to 
the anticipation and proactive up- or down regulation of specific neurocircuits before the 
actual encounter with the stressful event occurs. This will influence the actual regulatory 
response and will also have implications for the development of a balanced self-esteem. 
In other words, we argue that expectations about an upcoming stressful event shape the 
subsequent neuro-regulatory response in a manner that can be either adaptive or 
maladaptive. Although we will mainly focus on depression, this approach has also 
implications for a broad range of disorders and conditions in which stress regulation is 
considered to play a role. It may also provide a framework that can also be used to 
develop and fine-tune clinical interventions to facilitate proactive control. 
Our review is not intended to be an exhaustive consideration of all the literature in 
the areas we discuss. Rather, our goal is to provide a framework within which several 
distinct and diverse literatures might be integrated. We begin by providing a step-by step 
overview of all the building blocks of our neurocognitive framework, starting with the 
role of cognitive control and perceived control in emotion reactivity and emotional 
adjustment to stressful experiences. We then explain the role of expectancy, anticipation 
and proactive control in the person’s ability to regulate stress, and consider the neural 
substrates of these processes. We also further clarify the relationship of expectancy, 
anticipation and proactive control in emotion regulation and highlight how inter-
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individual differences such as self-esteem (actual and ideal self-esteem) and the tendency 
to accept (or resign oneself to the situation) when coping is not possible are related to 
regulatory control. Finally, we propose our integrated model and emphasize its clinical 
implications. 
Cognitive Control and Emotion Reactivity 
A functional balance between ventral (ventral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) and 
dorsal compartments in the brain (dorsal ACC, DLPFC) is thought to be necessary to 
maintain homeostatic control over emotion arousing stimuli (for an overview, see 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Negative information is more personally relevant for depressed 
people (increased bottom-up reactivity), who show impairments (decreased top-down 
control) in their abilities to exert cognitive control over negative thinking (De Raedt & 
Koster, 2010). It has further been proposed that decreased regulatory control leads to 
increased rumination and sustained negative affect (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & 
De Raedt, 2011). Consistent with this, neural systems that are dysfunctional in depression 
include circuitries related to emotional reactivity, cognitive control and rumination. 
Results from a large meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies reveal that, compared 
to healthy individuals, people diagnosed with major depression have higher baseline 
activity in the pulvinar, a large nucleus in the thalamus (Hamilton et al., 2012).  
Moreover, when exposed to negative stimuli, depressed people demonstrate greater 
responses in the amygdala, insula, and dorsal ACC, and lower responses in the dorsal 
striatum and DLPFC than do healthy comparison participants. Based on the role of the 
pulvinar nucleus in emotional attention and awareness as well as its connectivity with 
amygdala, insula and dorsal ACC, Hamilton and colleagues proposed that elevated 
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baseline pulvinar activity could potentiate the brain’s salience network to respond 
negative information.  
It is also possible that some of these neurocognitive characteristics might reflect  
trait vulnerability for depression. For example, Hooley and coworkers (Hooley, Gruber, 
Scott, Hiller, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2005; Hooley et al., 2009) have demonstrated that, 
relative to healthy controls, symptom free formerly depressed individuals responded to 
criticism with less activation in the DLPFC and increased activation in the amygdala. 
These findings are especially relevant given the reliable link between criticism and 
symptom relapse in depressed patients as well as patients with other disorders (Butzlaff 
& Hooley, 1998).  
Perceived Control 
How we perceive our current situation has important implications. The simple 
perception of having control over painful stimuli (even when this is not the case) 
activates the dorsal ACC, right dorsolateral, and bilateral anterolateral prefrontal cortices 
(Wiech et al., 2006). These are brain areas that are related to different forms of cognitive 
and emotional control. This suggests that perception of control is related to the same 
neurocircuits that are also implicated in actual control. Indeed, cognitive control has been 
defined as ‘‘the belief that one has at one’s disposal a response that can influence the 
aversiveness of an event’’ (Thompson, 1981, p. 89).   
Research has also demonstrated that people who are criticized by someone they 
perceive as being highly critical of them are less able to activate neurocircuits related to 
regulatory cognitive control over their emotions than are people who are criticized by a 
family member that they do not perceive as being highly critical (Hooley, Siegle, & 
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Gruber, 2012). More specifically, people high on perceived criticism show increased 
amygdala activation and decreased activation in prefrontal regulatory regions – even 
when the critical remarks they receive are not more severe or harsh than the critical 
comments heard by participants who regard their family members as less critical of them. 
This again supports the idea that perceptions may play a central role in shaping how we 
handle stressful experiences. 
It has also been observed that higher perceived control is associated with better 
emotional adjustment to stressful experiences such as bereavement, even after accounting 
for the effects of other variables such as neuroticism (Frazier, Steward, & Mortensen, 
2004). Yet depressed individuals often have a low sense of perceived control (Wardle et 
al., 2004).  
Expectancy 
The observation that depressed patients are characterized by low perceived control  
is consistent with the observation that people who are depressed have a negative 
expectation bias regarding their ability to deal with future stressful events, promoting a 
passive coping style (Alloy et al., 1999). The concept of expectancy is a central common 
core of personality dispositions related to different achievement areas (Haugen & Lund, 
1999). It is also highly related to how we cope with stressful events.  
Does knowing what to expect help us to handle stressful or conflict situations? The 
answer here appears to be yes. In experimental research, it has been demonstrated that 
when one expects that a cognitive conflict will occur (for example on certain trials) this 
may decrease the subsequent experience of conflict during task performance (Gratton, 
Coles, & Donchin, 1992).  
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In the laboratory, one way that conflict can be created is through the use of the 
Stroop task. In the classic Stroop task the person is asked to name the color of a printed 
word. One some trials the word and the color of the word are congruent (e.g., the word 
“blue” printed in blue ink). On other interference (or conflict) trials, the printed word and 
the color of the ink are incongruent (e.g., the word “green” printed in blue ink). In these 
tasks, expectancy can be manipulated by providing cues that inform the participants 
whether an upcoming target will or will not involve conflict (e.g., congruence or 
incongruence between color and meaning of the word) versus providing uninformative 
cues that provide no such relevant information. Behavioral responses are faster after 
informative than after uninformative cues (Aarts, Roelofs, & Van Turennout, 2008). This 
suggests that expectancy leads to adjustments in control. Importantly, in line with the 
above-mentioned role of the ACC in conflict monitoring, event related fMRI has revealed 
that ACC activity is larger after informative than after uninformative cues. This is the 
case even when the information provided is only that the upcoming target will not evoke 
response conflict. Such findings suggest that the ACC is involved in anticipatory control 
in a general way, independent from whether conflict will or will not actually occur. 
Interestingly, after informative cues, the left DLPFC is more active during the actual 
processing of the incongruent as compared to the congruent targets, highlighting its role 
in the implementation of cognitive control (for an overview, see Vanderhasselt, De Raedt 
& Baeken, 2009). 
The DLPFC might also have an important role in the active maintenance of 
expectancy based goal-relevant emotional information. This is nicely illustrated in an 
experiment that used an emotional variant of the Stroop task. More specifically, 
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participants had to indicate whether a facial expression was neutral or fearful in 
conditions where a congruent or an incongruent word was printed on top of a face 
picture. For example, in an incongruent trial the word “neutral” was printed on a fearful 
face. Expectancy for incongruent trials was manipulated by increasing the proportion of 
control-demanding incongruent trials (65% incongruent trials), which results in strategic 
adjustments in behavior and implementation of cognitive control processes. Functional 
MRI data revealed a switch in cognitive control strategy based on condition. In the low 
expectancy task (i.e., when incongruent trial was unlikely) participants showed a reactive 
event-related activation of a medial and lateral cognitive control network and the right 
amygdala. In the high expectancy condition, proactive, sustained activation of right 
DLPFC was apparent (Krug & Carter, 2012).  
Going beyond correlational data Vanderhasselt et al. (2007) used Repetitive 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) to study the causal relationship between 
activity in the right DLPFC and expectancy related processes. rTMS is an important 
technique because it provides researchers with a non-invasive way of transiently 
activating local processing in neural networks in the brain. As in the experiment by Krug 
and Carter (2012), Vanderhasselt and colleagues manipulated participants’ expectancies 
for incongruent stimuli in a (non-emotional) Stroop task, by adapting the ratio of 
congruent/incongruent trials. When the expectation of an incongruent trial was high 
(meaning that participants expected to have to name the color of the presented word 
rather than simply read the word) and after DLPFC activity was increased using high 
frequency rTMS, participants showed a decreased response time. This was found on both 
congruent and incongruent Stroop trials, although the findings were more pronounced on 
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incongruent trials. No behavioral changes were apparent after sham placebo rTMS 
stimulation. These findings suggest that increased activity in right DLPFC results in an 
overall improved attentional preparatory set, underscoring the role of the right DLPFC in 
general expectancy processes. The findings further suggest that greater activation in right 
DLPFC permits enhanced strategic top-down attentional processes under conditions 
where conflict is expected. In another study using a task switching paradigm, it was also 
observed that cued (a light informed participants about an upcoming switch trial) 
switching from one modality (visual) to another modality (auditory) was influenced by 
right DLPFC stimulation. In contrast, uncued switching was not influenced by 
stimulation (Vanderhasselt, De Raedt, Baeken, Leyman, & D'Haenen, 2006). All these 
findings suggest that expectancy increases DLPFC related anticipatory preparation to 
deal with an upcoming conflict.  
Anticipation and Proactive Control 
Recently, it has been demonstrated that cognitive effort exerted during anticipation 
of an emotion eliciting stimulus is related to lower cognitive effort when confronted with 
that stimulus (Vanderhasselt, Remue, Ng, & De Raedt, 2014). In this latter study, 
participants’ pupillary responses (as a proxy of cognitive effort, related to DLPFC) were 
recorded while they were naturally responding to emotional stimuli. The anticipation of a 
stressor also elicits cardiovascular and affective responses, and the ability to recover may 
also be a crucial process related to stress resilience.  In a study by Waugh et al. (2010) a 
group of speech-givers was compared to a group who only anticipated giving a speech. 
Both groups exhibited similar cardiovascular recovery (decreased heart rate and increased 
respiratory sinus arrhythmia). However, in the anticipation group, those who showed no 
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recovery from negative affect showed less cardiovascular recovery, suggesting that 
failing to recover from anticipatory stress has  physiological costs. Interestingly, using an 
experimental design with neurostimulation (rTMS), it has also been  demonstrated that 
increased DLPFC activity is related to a decreased cardiovascular stress response 
(Remue, Vanderhasselt, Baeken, Rossi, Tullo & De Raedt, in press). 
Depressed patients have not only difficulties inhibiting a dominant response to 
negative versus positive situations and stimuli, but show also deficiencies in the 
anticipation phase of this process. This has been demonstrated in an Event Related 
Potentials (ERP) study in which expectancy for upcoming emotional conflict was 
induced by a cue (Vanderhasselt et al., 2014). Vanderhasselt and colleagues have 
demonstrated that the poorer inhibition of negative information that was characteristic of 
depressed patients was associated with a longer duration of a dominant ERP topography 
and with a stronger activity in the bilateral dorsal ACC, likely reflecting enhanced need 
for more reactive control during the inhibition of the negative stimulus. Importantly, the 
ERP data were indicative of a failure to exert efficient proactive cognitive control during 
the preparation period for the upcoming conflict stimulus (abnormal modulation of the 
Cued Negativity Variation component). Moreover, based on the results it could also be 
ruled out that this effect was simply caused by an overall breakdown in motivation. This 
is consistent with other findings showing that low motivation in depressed individuals is 
not the reason for cognitive task impairments (e.g., Whitmer & Banich, 2010).  
Taken together, the results of the studies we have described so far suggest that 
enhanced anticipation of conflict during a preparatory period is related to sustained right 
NEUROGNITIVE FRAMEWORK REGULATION EXPECTATION 13 
 
sided DLPFC activity. This decreases the need for reactive control (which is related to 
the dorsal ACC) when actually experiencing the conflict.  
The ACC can be conceived as a bridge between subcortical emotion processing and 
prefrontal cognitive control, integrating signals from the ventral parts of the ACC and the 
dorsal ACC (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). The dorsal ACC sends signals to the DLPFC 
to enhance attentional control when conflict is perceived (Hopfinger, Buonocore, & 
Mangun, 2000; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000).  The DLPFC has thus an 
important role in both anticipatory processing and the actual implementation of cognitive 
control upon conflict detection (see also Braver, 2012). Many studies have shown that the 
DLPFC initiates cognitive control over emotions by causing inhibition of the amygdala, a 
subcortical region implicated in emotion processing (Siegle, Thompson, Carter, 
Steinhauer, & Thase, 2007).  Although based on our overview, the left DLPFC appears to 
be mainly related to actual control (e.g., Aerts, Roelofs & Turenhout, 2008), whereas the 
right DLPFC seems more involved in the maintenance of goal related information (e.g., 
Vanderhasselt et al., 2006), caution is warranted because lateralization might be highly 
dependent on the emotional nature of the paradigms (neutral versus negative), and on 
specific characteristics of the tasks used (for a review, see Vanderhasselt, De Raedt & 
Baeken, 2009). This underscores the influence of specific task properties in frontal 
lateralization. 
Cognitive control includes abilities to hold abstract goals in mind, to provide “top-
down” attention allocation, updating information in working memory, selecting and 
switching to task relevant responses, while inhibiting thoughts or actions that are 
irrelevant to or incompatible with these goals (Banich, 2009).The result of successful 
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anticipation of stressful situations, leading to more efficient reactive control during the 
actual confrontation with the event, might dampen amygdala activity and increase a 
person’s ability to regulate stress.  
It deserves mention that the effects of anticipation and expectancy on neurocircuits 
involved in the regulation of emotional processes also overlap with circuitries related to 
expectancy in pain processing. In a recent study (Atlas et al., 2012), a placebo 
manipulation was combined with a potent opiate, and participants’ knowledge of drug 
delivery was manipulated in an open-hidden design. The opiate produced the most 
pronounced effects in the ACC, which was strongly associated with pain affect.  
Expectancies, as revealed by comparing the open and hidden administration, activated 
lateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortices and reduced responses in amygdala and pain-
processing regions. In another study (Amanzio, Benedetti, Porro, Palermo, & Cauda, 
2013), the left ACC, right precentral, and lateral prefrontal cortex were activated during 
expectation of analgesia. Interestingly, regions involved in physical pain, such as the 
ACC, seem to overlap with emotional pain (Eisenberger, 2012).  
To summarize, the key point here is that, even prior to the presentation of an 
arousing, conflicting or physically painful event, expectancy-related  preparation begins, 
which is a crucial process in stress regulation and recovery The specific dorsal neural 
correlates of this preparation are related to anticipation and to the proactive up- or down 
regulation of the implicated neurocircuits. Importantly, all of this happens before the 
actual encounter with these stressful events ever occurs. 
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Expectancy, Anticipation, Proactive Control and Emotion Regulation 
Depressed individuals typically have low expectancies concerning their ability to 
deal with future stressful events. Indeed, negative evaluations of the future are central to 
the cognitive model of depression (Beck, 1976), and hopelessness is a clinical feature of 
both severe and more mild depressions. Expectations about being unable to cope with 
future-oriented concerns are also found in people with anxiety disorders (Beck & Clark, 
1988). This is likely to create stressful anticipation and less initiation of proactive control 
in challenging situations. 
 In the case of proactive control, it is important to emphasize that emotions unfold 
over time. Lazarus (1991) was one of the first to propose that the primary emotional 
appraisal of the situation, establishing the significance or meaning of the event to the 
organism, can be qualitatively different from the secondary emotional appraisal, directed 
at the assessment of the ability to cope with the consequences of the event. Humans can 
regulate their emotional states through a number of cognitive strategies, and the most 
adaptive strategies may be those that  regulate emotions as soon as they are generated in 
order to reduce the emotion intensity over time. Gross (1998) proposes that emotions may 
be regulated either by manipulating the input to the system (antecedent-focused emotion 
regulation) or by manipulating its output (response-focused emotion regulation). 
According to the generic timing hypothesis (Sheppes & Gross, 2011), individuals’ 
arousal levels increase over time during the development of the emotional response. As a 
consequence, its regulation is more efficient when initiated in the early stages of the 
emotional response, that is, when its intensity is still low, rather than later on, when it is 
full-blown. , Indeed, emotions do not only occur  during an emotion eliciting event, for 
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example during a job interview. Preparatory brain/body responses can also arise when 
anticipating an emotion eliciting event, such as while travelling to the job interview. In 
several studies, anticipation of adversity has been related to DLPFC (e.g., Herwig et al., 
2010) and amygdala activity (Abler, Erk, Herwig, & Walter, 2007). Based on this 
reasoning, we would expect emotion regulation to be most adaptive if it begins as early as 
possible –that is, as soon as people begin to experience the emotions that arise during the 
anticipation of a stressful event. The fact that anticipatory proactive regulation for 
upcoming stressors can lead to more efficient emotion regulation during the actual 
confrontation itself has been confirmed in an experimental neuroimaging study in which 
participants could anticipate the need to cognitively reappraise the content of aversive 
images and use reality checking to reduce anticipatory emotional arousal. In other words, 
they could remind themselves that they were lying in a scanner and not really 
experiencing the negative event depicted in the aversive image they were viewing (see 
Herwig et al., 2007).  Brain activity during the anticipation of unpleasant (but still absent) 
stimuli was measured using fMRI. The use of anticipatory reappraisal was associated 
with increased activity in left prefrontal areas (e.g., medial and left DLPFC) that are 
typically associated with successful cognitive control.  Moreover, amygdala activation 
associated with cognitive control correlated negatively with the reappraisal scores on an 
emotion regulation questionnaire (Herwig et al., 2007).  
It is important to emphasize that the habitual use of strategies (such as reappraisal) 
to decrease anticipatory emotional arousal is related to the expectation of being able to 
deal with the stressful nature of the upcoming stimulus. But what if we have low 
expectations about our abilities to handle stressors or challenging situations? Our 
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expectation of our ability to regulate our reactions to stressful events might be related, not 
only to our anticipatory deployment of cognitive resources but also to our proactive up- 
or down regulation of specific neurocircuits before the actual stressful encounter occurs. 
To the extent that we expect to be able to handle challenge, and begin proactive 
regulation in advance, we may experience more efficient emotion regulation during the 
actual confrontation itself. But if we have low expectations of our abilities to handle 
stressful situations, we may not engage in anticipatory deployment of cognitive resources 
and we may fail to proactively up regulate or down regulate the specific neurocircuits that 
would serve us best in the given circumstances. In other words, we are arguing that 
expectations about an upcoming stressful event can shape the subsequent regulatory 
response, both at the emotional and behavioral level. 
To summarize, we can hypothesize that the expectancy of an individual’s 
regulatory abilities prior to the presentation of an emotion arousing event or task will be 
related to an active anticipation and the proactive up- or down regulation of specific 
neurocircuits before the actual encounter with stressful events. This leads to increased 
emotion regulation abilities when actually confronted with stressors.  
Self-Efficacy, Self-Esteem and Regulatory Control 
Self-efficacy and dispositional optimism are constructs that have been an important 
focus of empirical attention. Self-efficacy is defined as an individual’s belief about his or 
her ability to produce and regulate events in his or her life (Bandura, 1982). Optimism 
has been defined as having generalized favorable expectancies regarding future outcomes 
and has been related to effortful control. Indeed, optimistic people exert effort to deal 
with challenges, whereas pessimistic people disengage from effort (Carver & Scheier, 
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2014). Both self-efficacy and optimism are closely related to what we are referring to as 
regulation expectation to deal with stressful events. Self-efficacy (mainly as a moderator) 
is also highly related to resilience. People with a strong expectancy in their own self-
efficacy try harder to cope with difficult situations or challenges than do people with 
weak expectancy in their own efficacy (Haugen & Lund, 1999). Moreover, in Bandura’s 
theory of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982), it is argued that, by mastering challenging 
situations a person gradually builds up his or her sense of self-efficacy. All of this 
underscores the dynamic nature of the interaction between a person’s actual ability to 
regulate stressful events and his or her expectancy about being able to do so. Successful 
coping with stressful events might increase self-expectancy and also increase self-esteem. 
Moreover, real life corrective experiences might be the most potent way to activate neural 
systems underlying the development of new self-schemas (De Raedt, 2006). 
In a similar vein, optimism predicts better subjective well-being in times of 
adversity (e.g. Scheier et al., 1989), which is in line with observations that optimism is 
linked to higher levels of engagement coping and lower levels of avoidance, or 
disengagement coping (for a review, see Segerstrom & Nes, 2006). Moreover, there is 
evidence that optimistic people are inclined to take proactive steps to protect their health 
(for an overview of characteristics of optimism, see Carver, Scheier & Segerstrom, 2010). 
In contrast, having low expectancies of success or past experiences of failure might 
have the exactly the opposite effect. Cognitive theories of depression define negative 
self-schemas as memory structures based on past experiences that guide information 
processing and shape beliefs about the self, the world, and the future (Beck, 1967). 
Depressed individuals hold negative self-schemas and therefore are more cognitively 
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reactive to stressful events, which re-activate negative thought processes (Teasdale, 
1988), interfere with goal-directed thinking and behavior and decrease self-esteem. With 
regard to depression, in a large study (N=2855) it has been demonstrated that, in formerly 
depressed individuals, stressful life events had a significant, negative impact on self-
efficacy. In contrast, for those without prior depression, life events had no effect on self-
efficacy (Maciejewski, Prigerson, & Mazure, 2000).  
The relationship between expectancy and self-esteem is nicely illustrated in an 
fMRI study in which participants received feedback words that they had no possibility to 
control (Eisenberger, Inagaki, Muscatell, Haltom, & Leary, 2011). The words (e.g., 
shallow, boring, friendly) were ostensibly chosen by another individual who had listened 
to the participant's previously recorded interview. Unbeknownst to the participant, the 
other individual was a confederate and the feedback words were unrelated to the 
participant’s actual performance. While in the scanner, participants were shown the 
feedback words that purportedly describe their performance. After viewing each word, 
they were then asked to rate their self-esteem (on a 1-4 scale). As might be expected, 
participants reported significantly lower self-esteem after receiving negative (versus 
positive or neutral) feedback. Lower self-esteem (on a trial by trial basis) was also 
associated with greater activity in dorsal ACC - a brain region that, as we have already 
noted, has been linked to conflict processing and to emotional pain. Crucially, 
participants whose self-esteem decreased from prescan to postscan showed greater 
medial prefrontal (MPFC) cortical activity, a region associated with self-referential 
processing (Lemogne et al., 2010) in response to the negative feedback, compared to 
participants who’s self-esteem remained the same or improved. Specifically the ventral 
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MPFC plays a crucial role in the construction, stabilization, and modification of self-
representations (D’Argembeau, 2013). The findings of this study are thus in line with the 
idea that confrontation with uncontrollable stressful events such as negative feedback can 
lead to decreases in self-esteem, with an influence on VMPFC. 
The Role of Ideal Self-Esteem 
As argued by Haugen and Lund (1999), if the number and quality of successful 
achievements equal the expectancies of successful outcomes, one’s self-esteem is 
protected or enhanced. From the perspective of abilities to regulate stressful events, self-
esteem would be the product of positive experiences in dealing with stressful events, 
fuelling expectancies about future regulatory abilities. Coopersmith (1970, p. 245) 
defines self-esteem as ‘‘a comparison of one’s actual performance and capacities with 
one’s personal standards and aspirations.’’ James (1890) states that self-evaluations 
depend on the degree to which the self’s actual successes coincide with the self’s 
aspirations. This illustrates the potential importance of differentiating between actual 
self-esteem and ideal self-esteem to understand the link between self-esteem and 
expectancies. The ideal self has been defined as a representation of attributes a person 
would like to have. The ideal self functions as an incentive for future behavior (Cross & 
Markus, 1991), underscoring its relationship with expectations about the ability to 
regulate behavior when confronted with adversity. Depression is characterized by biased 
negative expectancies about the ability to deal with problems, and depressed patients 
typically have low self-esteem (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Many studies have 
provided evidence for the role of discrepancies between ideal and actual views in 
depression (e.g., Moretti & Higgins, 1999). Moreover, it has been proposed that the 
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actual–ideal discrepancy influences self-regulatory (Carver & Scheier, 1982), 
motivational (Markus & Nurius, 1986), and affective (Moretti & Higgins, 1990) 
processes.  
Nonetheless, it is important to note that there are fundamental issues about what 
constitutes support for the actual-ideal discrepancy model and how the constructs should 
be measured to test predictions (see Scalas & Marsh, 2008). First, there are studies in 
which no support was found for the idea that each discrepancy correlates with a specific 
emotional state (e.g., Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998). Second, the simple 
actual – ideal difference score approach has been criticized (e.g. Marsh & Roche, 1996). 
A crucial issue is that it is not possible to distinguish between the variance specific to 
each measure. A multiple experiment study using Structural Equation Modeling showed 
that actual and ideal self can have a different effect on self concept (Scalas & Marsh, 
2008). A critical issue is that both aspects of self-esteem may be high or low (and thus in 
both cases there is a similar absence of discrepancy). For this reason, discrepancy scores 
may be less valuable than a focus on the combination of ideal-self and actual-self, in such 
a way to allow the existence of all combinations (high-high; low-low; high-low; low-
high). Moreover, concerning the measurement issues, self-report measures on self 
concept may be susceptible to response biases such as social desirability and self-
presentation, and cognitive models assume that self-related schemata are not always 
consciously accessible and thus cannot always be reported upon (e.g., Young, 1994). 
Therefore, alternative implicit measurement procedures have recently been developed 
that operate in such a way that they do not depend on introspective access. In two recent 
studies using such an implicit measure, which enables the differentiation of ideal self and 
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actual self-esteem, it was demonstrated that dysphoric individuals have higher ideal self-
esteem, and lower actual self-esteem compared to healthy participants (Remue, De 
Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2013; Remue, Hughes, De Houwer 
& De Raedt, 2014). 
Within our formulation, low self-esteem (both actual and ideal) is hypothesized to 
be related to low expectancy about the ability to deal with stressors. However, high ideal 
self-esteem might not invariably be a positive thing. For example, high ideal self esteem 
might be related to a low tendency to accept  in situations where the person fails in his or 
her efforts to regulate the stressor. In other words, it is the combination of actual and 
ideal self-esteem that we view as being uniquely related to expectancies as well as to be 
able to accept the possible inability to cope when dealing with future stressors, and not 
the simple ideal-actual discrepancy. Different combinations can be expected to lead to 
different anticipation processes, both at the cognitive and the neural level, eventually 
leading also to differences in coping success.   
Accepting the inability to deal with stressors 
The specific adaptive response to stress will depend very much on context. In real 
life threatening situations, it is not always adaptive to reappraise a situation as harmless. 
Some situations (such as being chased by a lion) require action, not reappraisal.  In yet 
other situations, accepting (or coming to terms with the situation) may be the optimal 
coping strategy. Whereas self-efficacy is defined as being confident that one will cope 
well regardless of outcome (Bandura, 1982), we would maintain that accepting one’s 
inability to cope is also an important and highly relevant factor. Some people might not 
be confident about their ability to cope in a given situation, yet be fully able to accept 
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this. It is also the case that high self-efficacy is most likely to be beneficial in situations 
that are potentially controllable. When no control is possible, high self-efficacy might 
even be counterproductive (Stewart & Yuen, 2011). Dogged determination to exert 
control over an uncontrollable situation is not likely to be an optimal coping strategy in 
all cases. Instead, optimal coping will sometimes require an ability to disengage effort, 
accepting that there are no solutions that can be used to deal with the stressful event. In 
other words, expectations can be considered to be adaptive when they are both positive (I 
will be able to deal with this), and tempered with accepting if it becomes apparent that 
the problem cannot be solved (If I can’t make this work, I will accept it). This is an 
important way in which our construct of regulation expectation differs from the construct 
of self-efficacy. It should also be noted that although accepting defeat in a situation 
where success is impossible is adaptive, accepting failure prematurely   is not.  
The important role of accepting in regulatory control is nicely illustrated in a study 
where mindfulness meditators and community-matched controls completed a Stroop task 
during which event related brain potentials were recorded. Meditators showed better 
cognitive control. Moreover, the link between meditation practice and cognitive control 
was explained by both emotional acceptance and increased brain-based monitoring of 
their performance (which was indexed by the Error Related Negativity signal) (Teper & 
Inzlicht, 2013).  
An Integrated Model 
Central to our model is the idea that individual expectancies concerning regulatory 
abilities will be related to anticipation and pro-active up or down-regulation of specific 
neural circuits. This occurs in advance of the actual stressful event or emotional challenge 
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being experienced. Moreover, how people prepare to cope with challenges or stressful 
experiences is a function both of their past coping experiences as well as their actual and 
ideal self-esteem. This sets the stage for proactive control. During exposure to the 
stressor, reactive control processes are also in play. The nature of and extent to which 
these are operative will depend, in large measure on the degree of proactive control that 
has already occurred. Being able to rise to a challenge also requires the ability to know 
when to quit. Some stressors cannot be handled by active coping. In such circumstances 
accepting this may be the optimal approach.  
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In Figure 1 we describe a model that outlines how actual and ideal self-esteem 
interact to create different expectancies for stress regulation. We also describe some of 
the neurocognitive predictions that stem from this model.   
As illustrated in Figure 1, there are four combinations of ideal and actual self-
esteem. For individuals with low actual and high ideal self-esteem, expectancy to be able 
to regulate their behavior and emotions when confronted with stressful situations is 
predicted to be low. Such people will also have difficulties accepting the possibility that 
they might fail to meet their own high standards in dealing with the stressor. Indeed, low 
self-esteem is related to low expectancies about dealing with adversity (Tripp, Catano, & 
Sullivan, 1997), and combinations of ideal self and actual self has been related to feeling 
disappointed, dissatisfied, ineffective, and having a lack of interest in things (Higgins, 
1987). When such individuals anticipate a stressful event, they will be characterized by 
passive but stressful anticipation, leading to increased negative self-referential thoughts, 
which is related to increased VMPFC activity, and increased amygdala activity. 
According to our formulation, this will lead to low ability to regulate the stressful 
situation, and failure in challenging tasks, both of which might further fuel actual 
negative self-esteem.  Based on this reasoning, we might expect that an individual with 
high ideal self-esteem will set high personal standards but the combination with low 
actual self-esteem might lead to failure, creating a vicious cycle of stressful anticipation 
and subsequent disappointment. 
People with both high actual and high ideal self-esteem are predicted to have a 
high expectancy about their ability to regulate stressors, combined with a low tendency to 
accept failure. Such people might be characterized by ambitious striving and active 
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stressful anticipation when faced with an upcoming challenging situation. This stressful 
anticipation might, however, lead to depleted cognitive resources, decreased DLPFC 
activity and increased amygdala activity. Accordingly, we would predict that these 
people would also experience difficulties coping with stressors and any negative 
experiences would render their high self-esteem fragile. Based on our model, we might 
further expect that people with high actual and high ideal self-esteem would be 
characterized by rigid perseveration and difficulty disengaging from their goals in an 
effort to meet their high standards and protect their self-esteem.   
In cases where low actual self-esteem is combined with low ideal self-esteem we 
would predict a passive style with low expectancies and a high tendency to accept the 
inability to cope when anticipating challenges, and no engagement in proactive control, 
as well as a failure to activate specific neurocircuits. This may be accompanied by a 
relatively weak stress response. People with a profile of low actual and low ideal self-
esteem would be predicted to have low approach motivation, and to anticipate future 
events in a passive way. 
Finally, high actual self-esteem and low ideal self-esteem would be related to high 
expectancy to regulate stressors, and also to high tendency to accept failure in 
circumstances where is it is not possible to deal adequately with the specific challenge. It 
is in such people that we would expect to see increased proactive control and anticipatory 
left DLPFC activity, leading to effective control over emotions and decreased amygdala 
activity. At the behavioral level, this would translate into high ability to regulate the 
stressful situation, successful coping outcomes and preserved self-esteem.  
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Clinical Implications 
The expectations patients hold regarding the effects of psychotherapy have long 
been considered a key ingredient and common factor of successful psychotherapy (e.g., 
Goldfried, 1980). Indeed, it has been shown that positive outcome expectancies for 
treatment predict better therapy outcomes (for a meta-analysis, see Constantino, Arnkoff, 
Glass, Ametrano & Smith, 2011). Moving beyond this, however, the neurocognitive 
expectancy framework we have outlined has several other important clinical implications. 
Theseconcern the potential importance of both increasing positive expectancies and also 
fostering an ability to accept  when coping is not possible. In the sections below, we 
discuss specific approaches that might be valuable with respect to these constructs.      
Increasing positive expectancies 
Increasing positive expectancies is important because these fuel anticipatory 
processes, leading to increased proactive control in such a way that there is less need for 
reactive control to cope with stressful events. This in turn would increase the ability to 
cope with stressors, resulting in more positive experiences. These experiences would in 
turn strengthen self-esteem, which might subsequently be a buffer for new depressive 
episodes. Indeed, depressed individuals with sudden gains outside of the context of 
treatment have significantly higher self-esteem compared to non-sudden gainers (Kelly, 
Roberts, & Bottonari, 2007). In contrast, after negative experiences with stressful events, 
decreased self-esteem would likely influence the anticipation of similar future events, 
leading to the activation of dysfunctional schemas and self-reflective negative thoughts, 
and decreased expectancy of the ability to cope before the actual confrontation with the 
event.  
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Both Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT) and Neurocognitive Therapies (NT) (De 
Raedt, 2015) provide experiences that, in our view, are capable of influencing the way 
people perceive their environments and facilitating the development of new positive 
expectancies. For example, in CBT, the patient is encouraged to process schema-
incongruent information to develop more adaptive schemas regarding the self, the world 
and the future. Beck (1967) has emphasized that behavioral experiments in CBT are 
important because they have the potential to provide corrective experiences -- 
experiences that facilitate the development of more adaptive schema content, which 
would eventually lead to more positive expectancies. There is also robust evidence for the 
crucial importance of the behavioral component of CBT, which even outperforms the 
effect of the cognitive component (Dimidjian et al., 2006). Positive expectancies might 
lead to active anticipation and increased proactive control, and eventually more positive 
experiences with stressors, ultimately influencing self-esteem. Importantly, using 
techniques such as cognitive restructuring, expectancy related cognitions can also be 
targeted directly. Anton,  Dunbar and Friedman (1976) even developed anticipation 
training for the treatment of depression, to foster these expectancy related cognitive 
changes. 
However, whereas CBT treatments can be successful in fostering positive 
experiences concerning the ability to cope with challenging situations to influence 
negative self-schemas, this could be problematic in depressed patients. Indeed, although 
CBT is undoubtedly an effective form of treatment, not all patients derive benefit 
(Cuijpers et al., 2013). Research with healthy individuals has indicated that exposure to 
uncontrollable stressors leads to passivity, decreased performance on cognitive tasks and 
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negative affect (e.g., Kofta & Sedek, 1989), whereas exposure to stressful situations that 
can be escaped or modulated by learning new behavioral responses leads to unimpaired 
or even improved performance on similar cognitive tasks (e.g., Eisenberger, Park, & 
Frank, 1976). As stated by Kaiser et al. (Kaiser, Hubley, & Dimidjian, 2014) behavioral 
treatment starts from the idea that engagement in active behaviors in the pursuit of goals 
will ultimately lead to decreased depressive symptoms and improved daily functioning. 
However, this is challenging because these behaviors might be inherently stressful. The 
fact that stressful events have a negative influence on cognitive control in depressed 
people (Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2009) increases the risk of exposing these patients to 
negative (and not positive) experiences. Indeed, studies based on the concept of learned 
helplessness have shown that depressed individuals fail to benefit from behavioral 
control, showing poor cognitive performance after both controllable and uncontrollable 
exposure to stressor, (e.g., Miller & Seligman, 1976). In this perspective, our new 
framework highlights the importance of interventions that facilitate both (1) the creation 
of new experiences to influence the way patients perceive their environment to increase 
positive expectancies, and (2) which simultaneously increase cognitive control. To 
facilitate these processes, the use of NT procedures has been proposed as a new 
therapeutic intervention for depression (Baert, Koster, & De Raedt, 2011; Siegle et al., 
2007). Here, we can distinguish between two different cognitive training procedures that 
might lead to increased stress resilience. (1) Visuospatial cueing tasks to train attention 
away from negative towards positive information, influencing the way individuals 
perceive their environment, which would eventually lead to new corrective experiences 
with more positive aspects of the situation; and (2) cognitive control training to increase 
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the ability to shift away from negative internal presentations in working memory, which 
would lead to decreased rumination and facilitate reappraisal of negative to positive 
expectancies (De Raedt, Vanderhasselt & Baeken, 2015). However, studies have shown 
that these training procedures might be effective in dysphoric individuals (Wells & 
Beevers, 2010), but less so in depressed patients (Baert et al., 2010, but see Siegle et al., 
2014), possibly because depressed individuals are, given their dysfunctional DLPFC 
related cognitive abilities, unable to deploy their cognitive resources. 
Based on our observation that depressed individuals are characterized by 
dysfunctional proactive anticipatory processing, leading to an increased need for reactive 
control (Vanderhasselt et al., 2014), it might be important to combine both CBT and NT. 
Using two different strategies each tackling a different aspect of the process (CBT: 
content level of cognition; NT mechanistic level of cognition) might increase the power 
to create positive expectancy about the ability to deal with stressful events in depressed 
patients. Moreover, psychoeducation about the working mechanisms of the intervention 
could also fuel positive expectancies. This combination might lead to active anticipation 
and increased proactive and reactive control, and positive experiences with stressors, 
influencing self-esteem.  
The role of adaptive accepting  
Based on our framework, we would maintain that therapy should not only be 
focused on behavioral strategies (behavioral experiments and activation) and negative 
self-schemas (cognitive restructuring) - which are the main components of CBT-  or the 
enhancement of cognitive control (CCT). Adaptive forms of expectancy (i.e., high 
expectancy, high tendency to accept) also need to be considered.  
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     The ability to accept potential negative outcomes of situations could be targeted via 
tailored CBT techniques, such de-catastrophizing (cognitive restructuring).  Moreover, 
recently developed computerized Cognitive Bias Modification of Interpretation (CBMi) 
techniques such as reappraisal training might also be very promising to accomplish these 
goals (Woud, Postma, Holmes & Mackintosh, 2013). These computerized CBMI 
techniques have the unique feature  that they can be adapted to target very specific 
appraisals. These could include  the ability to accept that one might  be unable to cope 
with certain stressors. 
Actual and ideal self-discrepancies also provide a specific treatment target. For 
those individuals who have difficulties accepting the possibility that they might fail to 
meet their own high standards (ideal self), therapeutic strategies such as Mindfulness 
Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT: Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2012) could be used. It 
has been demonstrated that MBCT is a promising intervention for decreasing 
vulnerability (Chiesa & Serretti, 2011), and can influence discrepancies between actual 
self and ideal self (Crane et al., 2008), emphasizing that MBCT may protect against 
increases in self-discrepancy in individuals who are vulnerable to relapse to depression, 
and may facilitate a shift in the goals of self-regulation. Interestingly, it has also been 
shown that MBCT has a positive influence on cognitive control for emotional 
information (De Raedt et al., 2012). Moreover, Bryant et al. (2013) have demonstrated 
that the response to exposure therapy (which itself is a very stressful procedure) in post-
traumatic stress disorder can be enhanced by preparing patients beforehand by emotion 
regulation therapy including mindfulness. 
Future research 
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Our review provides empirical support for the sub-processes of the framework we 
describe. However, future research should test the framework as a whole. This can be 
achieved by measuring actual self and ideal self esteem (using both questionnaires and 
implicit measures) in combination with a measure of all combinations between 
expectancy and the tendency to accept (high expectancy, high tendency to accept; high 
expectancy, low tendency to accept; low expectancy, high tendency to accept ; low 
expectancy, low tendency to accept ). The crucial test would be to investigate whether the 
combinations we propose would be related to anticipation and proactive control, and the 
ability to deal with stressors. Although there are excellent measures to index ideal and 
actual self-esteem (both implicit and explicit, see Remue et al., 2014), future research 
should be focused on the development of procedures to assess the dimensions of 
expectancy/acceptance tendency. We have now developed a questionnaire to measure 
each of the combinations of expectancy and the tendency to accept during anticipation. 
This questionnaire is designed to be used with a context manipulation that involves a 
stressful task. Research to validate this instrument is currently ongoing.  
Notwithstanding the importance of more empirical research, however, our 
framework has heuristic value for clinical practice. We provide a new approach that may 
help clinicians and clinical research understand how the mechanisms of action of existing 
therapeutic interventions might target different aspects of stress resilience. Indeed, there 
is currently no comprehensive framework capable of combining all these different 
aspects to increase our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of action of existing 
interventions targeting crucial components such as expectancy. Importantly, we do not 
propose new concepts or interventions as such, but a framework combining existing 
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knowledge to understand how their mechanisms of action target different aspects of stress 
resilience.  
Conclusion 
The Neurocognitive Framework for Regulation Expectation holds the potential to 
enhance understanding and encourage further investigation of how self-esteem, 
expectancies, and the tendency to accept are related to proactive and reactive control. The 
framework also highlights how novel techniques such as NT, CBMi, and MBCT could be 
used to influence these processes. This could hold promise for the refinement or the 
combination of these approaches with current treatment strategies such as CBT, and 
provide indications for the use of these techniques in a personally-tailored way. Regions 
sensitive to CBT are primarily lateral frontal regions (Graham et al., 2013), which are 
related to both proactive and reactive control (e.g. Vanderhasselt et al., 2014).  CBT, in 
which patients use behavioural and cognitive strategies to reduce negative thoughts and 
attitudes and corresponding reactivity, leads to changes in brain activity in these 
prefrontal regions (DLPFC, dACC) (e.g., Goldapple et al., 2004). CBT not only requires 
patients to test their interpretations and beliefs via behavioral experiments, leading to 
positive expectancies, but cognitive restructuring can also be used to influence an 
adaptive accepting attitude. Neurocognitive training (e.g., Browning, Holmes, Murphy, 
Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010) as well as meditation (Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, Schaefer, 
Levinson, & Davidson, 2007) have also been related to changes in the above mentioned 
dorsal areas.  However, although it has been concluded that mindfulness allows flexible 
emotion regulation by engaging frontal brain areas to dampen amygdala activation, and 
that there is a large overlap between areas activated during mindfulness, psychotherapy, 
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and those activated by placebo induced expectancy (for a review, see Chiesa, Brambilla, 
& Serretti, 2011), the exact mechanisms underlying these specific changes are not yet 
understood.  
Current interventions may be not specific enough in targeting the mechanisms 
associated with the causation and/or maintenance of psychopathology. The fact that there 
is such frequent relapse - even after initially successful treatment (Beshai, Dobson, 
Bockting, & Quigley, 2011) - indicates that stable risk factors for depression are not 
(sufficiently) changed through traditional interventions. Our framework could be used to 
guide practice and further research into the influence of cognitive control mechanisms 
that  subserve adaptive emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal of stressful 
events, by facilitating shifting processes towards positive information, leading to more 
positive expectancies for future events. Indeed, adaptive emotion regulation strategies are 
an important predictor for resilience, the phenomenon of maintaining one’s mental health 
even when confronted with adversity (Kalisch, Müller, & Tüscher, 2014). It is of crucial 
importance to know (1) which components of therapy could be most beneficial, and (2) 
what might work best for whom. Concerning the latter, our framework highlights the key 
roles of self-esteem and adaptive accepting when control is not possible,  and suggests 
that these warrant increased consideration in the development of more personalized 
treatment approaches.   
Finally, we would note that, although our framework is mainly focused on 
depression, it is important to keep in mind that many different disorders such as anxiety 
(Ball, Ramsawh, Campbell-Sills, Paulus & Stein, 2013) and substance abuse (Gowin, 
Mackey & Paulus, 2013) involve the same neurocircuits with the DLPFC playing a key 
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role. Depression is also a disorder that is frequently comorbid with a broad range of 
clinical conditions. For these reasons, our approach should be regarded as more 
transdiagnostic than depression-specific. 
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